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Multiplex dynamics of
two-mode and one-mode networks,
with an application to
employment preference and friendship
Abstract
We propose a new stochastic actor-oriented model for the co-evolution of
two-mode and one-mode networks. The model posits that activities of a set
of actors, represented in the two-mode network, co-evolve with exchanges
and interactions between the actors, as represented in the one-mode
network. The model assumes that only the actors have agency.
The empirical value of the model is demonstrated by examining how
employment preferences co-evolve with friendship and advice relations in
a group of seventy-five MBA students. The analysis shows that activity in
the two-mode network, as expressed by number of employment
preferences, is related to activity in the friendship network, as expressed by
outdegrees. Further, advice ties between between students lead to
agreement with respect to employment preferences. In addition,
considering the multiplexity of advice and friendship ties yields a better
understanding of the dynamics of the advice relation: tendencies to
reciprocation and homophily in advice relations are mediated to an
important extent by friendship relations.
The discussion pays attention to the implications of this study in the
broader context of current efforts to model the co-evolutionary dynamics of
social networks and individual behavior.
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Highlights:
• A stochastic actor-oriented model is presented for the co-evolution of
one-mode and two-mode networks.
• The dynamics is studied of friendship, advice, and employment
preferences in a MBA cohort.
• There is a positive triadic dependency between advice ties and
agreement in employment preferences.
• Advice and friendship are positively associated at the dyad level and
negatively at the actor level.
• Reciprocation and homophily in advice are largely mediated by
friendship relations.
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1 Motivation
Two-mode networks are often used to represent the association between social
actors and activities, groups, or events with which the actors may be affiliated.
For this reason two-mode network are also called affiliation networks
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994, Chapter 2). Following Borgatti and Everett
(1997) we understand the concept of affiliation in a broad sense to include
membership in organizations and groups, participation in activities, and
association between individuals and values, beliefs, or attitudes. The latter type
of attributes do not always lead to a structure that one might regard as a
two-mode network. One may pose the requirement that sharing such values,
beliefs, or attitudes should lead to contacts between the actors, thereby
representing a social focus (Feld, 1981) for the actors constituting the first
mode. As a generic term for the second mode of the network we will use the
term activity rather than the more usual event (cf. Faust, 1997), to underscore
our focus on enduring affiliations as well as the duality between actors and
activities (Breiger, 1974).
Joint participation of actors in activities will go together with other
interactions and/or exchanges between these actors. We go with friends to
meeting places, we may make new friends there whom subsequently we also
meet elsewhere, and we may interrupt friendships relations with people whom
we never meet at any meeting place. We talk with friends about our
convictions, the number of shared convictions may influence the probability to
remain friends, and our friends may convince us of their views. Thus, a
two-mode network often goes together with interactions that can be described
by one-mode networks. An example is provided by the socio-semantic
networks of Roth and Cointet (2010), where researchers who interact may be
led to using the same concepts, and the use by scientists of the same concepts
may promote, or cement, their interaction. The present article presents a
methodology for studying the co-evolution, or interdependent dynamics, of
one-mode networks representing interactions among a set of actors and
two-mode networks representing the affiliation of these actors with a socially
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relevant set of activities or settings. The model combines (two-mode)
‘membership network analysis’ and (one-mode) ‘social-relations network
analysis’ (Breiger, 1974, p. 183). It builds upon earlier models for dynamics
of single networks, proposed for one-mode networks by Snijders (2001) and
for two-mode networks by Koskinen and Edling (2010). We add to available
models the possibility of representing the interdependence between the
different networks.
The mutual association between one-mode and two-mode networks was
studied recently by Roth and Cointet (2010). The methods discussed and
proposed in this paper and ours are complementary. Roth and Cointet (2010)
present descriptive methods for the level of the entire network and
communities within the network, uncovering a variety of interesting patterns in
the data and comparing these with what would be expected under a uniformly
random null model. We focus on the micro-level of actors in the network and
their immediate surroundings, and propose a model that allows the
combination of several different generative principles (‘effects’), thus
permitting statistical inference by testing a theory or hypothesis while
controlling for alternative theories or principles. A further difference between
the two approaches is that Roth and Cointet (2010) consider a growing
network, where nodes can enter the network, and ties cannot be terminated.
Our model assumes fixed node sets and allows creation as well as termination
of ties. Entry of actors or activities into the system, and exit from the system,
may be allowed by using the methods of Huisman and Snijders (2003) and
Ripley, Snijders and Preciado (2012).
We illustrate the model in a study of a cohort of MBA students, who are
strongly oriented toward preparing themselves for the job market and finding a
desired employer. Shared employment preferences lead to association and
common orientations between individuals, thereby defining a meaningful
two-mode network, that may be expected to be interdependent with the
friendship and advice-related interactions between individuals (cf. Kilduff,
1990). Job search in this group of students may be regarded as providing a
social context, i.e., a configuration of “foci and individuals, where each
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individual is related to some foci but not to others” (Feld, 1981, p. 1016). The
foci in our illustration are potential employers and the individuals are the
MBA students. For the exchanges between the students both friendship and
advice are relevant, and therefore we consider not only the co-evolution of a
two-mode and a one-mode network, but also the co-evolution of these two
one-mode networks. The example thus illustrates not only the multiplexity
arising from a combination of affiliation networks and interaction networks,
but also the multiplexity of two one-mode interaction networks. Available
statistical models for multiplexity are of a cross-sectional nature (see Lazega
and Pattison, 1999; Pattison and Wasserman, 1999). The longitudinal nature of
our approach leads to clarifying the time ordering of different relational events.
For example, we show (cf. Section 7) that the tendency toward certain
structures in the advice network can be understood as emerging from the
friendship network and the dependency of advice on friendship.
We continue the article by discussing the primary kinds of dependence
between two-mode and one-mode networks in Section 2 and then outline the
proposed model in Section 3. The example of the networks of MBA students
is introduced in Section 4. The empirical model specification is presented in
Section 5 and the results in Section 6. Section 7 discusses how these results
illustrate that emergent properties in networks may be understood better by
considering the co-evolution of multiple networks, and Section 8 gives further
conclusions.
2 Dependencies between one-mode and two-mode
networks
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of network evolution is the feedback of
network structure onto itself: how does current, or past, network structure lead
to changes in ties and thereby to change of network structure, or – as the case
may be – dynamic regeneration or confirmation of network structure? A
co-evolutionary model of a one-mode and a two-mode network must represent,
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in addition to the internal dynamic dependencies of each of these networks,
the dependencies across networks. Within-network dependencies are
represented here as in the models proposed by Koskinen and Edling (2010) for
two-mode and Snijders (2001) for one-mode networks. This paper focuses on
the cross-network dependencies: how does the one-mode network influence the
two-mode network, and vice versa how does the two-mode network influence
the one-mode network.
For a brief overview of notation, suppose that one two-mode network and
one one-mode network are being considered. The two-mode network is
denoted Y , the node sets (modes) being a set N of social actors i and a set A
of social activities a. This network is composed of tie variables Yia for
i ∈ N , a ∈M, with Yia = 1 if actor i participates in activity a, and Yia = 0
otherwise. The one-mode network X has node set N and directed tie variables
Xij for i, j ∈ N (i "= j), indicating the existence of an interaction tie from
actor i to actor j. We assume that there is no meaningful directionality in the
two-mode network that would imply a distinction between ties directed from
N to A, and ties directed from A to N . Notionally we represent the
two-mode ties as being directed from N to A, but this has no special
interpretation. Everywhere in this paper replacing an index by a + sign
denotes summation over this index.
The first mode N represents the set of actors, who choose elements of a
set A of activities or affiliations that constitutes the second mode. Thus, only
the first mode has agency, and we do not explicitly model situations where
individuals would like to join activities but may be refused by the activities, or
where the memberships are the results of two-sided match-making as in Logan
(1998).
The one-mode and two-mode networks have no dyads in common, so that
dyadic dependencies do not arise. Two basic types of dependencies between
the one-mode and the two-mode networks are by actors and by triads. We
consider them in turn.
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2.1 Actor-level dependencies
At the actor level, a fundamental issue is how positional characteristics of an
actor in one network affect her position in the other network. As positional
characteristics of actors i ∈ N , we consider in the one-mode network the
outdegrees Xi+ and indegrees X+i, and in the two-mode network the
outdegrees Yi+. Outdegrees in either network will be regarded as expressions
of activity, while indegrees in the one-mode network will be regarded as
expressions of popularity. Depending on the meaning of the networks, these
interpretations may be replaced by other appropriate representations.
Combining the various types of degree in the roles where one network is the
antecedent (‘explanatory variable’) while the other network is the consequence
(‘dependent variable’) yields the following four mixed degree-related effects.
1. One-mode activity ⇒ two-mode activity (nominating many friends leads
to many activities; Xij ⇒ Yia in Fig. 1a);
2. two-mode activity ⇒ one-mode activity (having many activities leads to
nominating many friends; Yia ⇒ Xij in Fig. 1a);
3. one-mode popularity ⇒ two-mode activity (being nominated by many
friends leads to many activities; Xji ⇒ Yia in Fig. 1b);
4. two-mode activity ⇒ one-mode popularity (having many activities leads
to being nominated by many friends; Yia ⇒ Xji in Fig. 1b).
The first two of these effects influence the number of mixed two-stars in the
network, and the last two the number of mixed two-paths, as illustrated in
Figure 1.
2.2 Triadic dependencies
Closed triads are impossible in two-mode networks (cf. Robins and Alexander,
2004). However, mixed triads are possible, and represent mixed transitive
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Xij
Yia
j
i
a
a. Mixed X − Y activity
(mixed out-twostar).
Xji
Yia
j
i
a
b. X-popularity ∼ Y -activity
(mixed two-path).
Figure 1: Circles, left, are actors in N . The square, right, is an activity in A.
closure: e.g., a friend’s club is my club, or a clubmate is a friend, see
Figure 2. More abstractly, specifying the two causal or temporal directions, the
twopath consisting of a one-mode tie i X→ j followed by a two-mode tie j Y→ a
can be closed by a two-mode tie i Y→ a; and agreement between i and j in the
form of the two-mode two-instar (i Y→ a Y← j) can be closed by the one-mode
tie i X→ j. This leads to the following possibilities.
1. One-mode out-tie ⇒ two-mode agreement (‘I become/stay a member of
a club having as a member somebody whom I consider a friend’:
{Xij and Yja}⇒ Yia in Fig. 2);
2. One-mode in-tie ⇒ two-mode agreement (‘I become/stay a member of a
club having as a member somebody who calls me a friend’:
{Xij and Yia}⇒ Yja);
3. Two-mode agreement ⇒ one-mode out-tie (‘I become/stay friends with
members of my club’: {Yia and Yja}⇒ Xij).
These effects influence the number of the mixed triplets, see Figure 2, each
by adding a different tie in this triplet. The fact that these three effects all have
the consequence of promoting the same type of mixed triads implies that they
may be difficult to distinguish empirically. This may be the more so for the
former two, as both have the two-mode network as the dependent variable.
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Yia
Yjai
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Figure 2: One-mode tie ∼ two-mode agreement (mixed triplet).
Circles, left, are actors in N . Squares, right, are activities in A.
3 Basic model
The model is described here as a model for the co-evolution of one one-mode
and one two-mode network. It can be extended in a straightforward way to the
co-evolution of arbitrary numbers of networks of either kind. The model
extends stochastic actor-oriented models for the dynamics of one-mode
networks (Snijders, 2001) and for the dynamics of networks and behavior
(Steglich, Snijders and Pearson, 2010), to which a tutorial introduction is given
in Snijders, van de Bunt and Steglich (2010). For further background and
explanations we refer to these papers. It is assumed that the data available is a
panel study of the two networks: for time points t1, t2, . . . , tM (where M ≥ 2),
the one-mode network and the two-mode network are observed, and
represented by their adjacency matrices X(t1), Y (t1) to X(tM), Y (tM). Two
fundamental model assumptions are that the networks change, unobserved,
between the observation moments at arbitrary time points, while at each
moment of change only a single tie variable Xij(t) or Yia(t) may change. This
framework was proposed already by Holland and Leinhardt (1977).
Mathematically the first assumption is formulated by saying that
(
X(t), Y (t)
)
is a continuous-time stochastic process, where time parameter t traverses the
interval from t1 to tM . The two assumptions together decompose the change
process that brought one observation
(
X(tm), Y (tm)
)
to the next(
X(tm+1), Y (tm+1)
)
into its smallest components, changes of single tie
variables. The advantage is that instead of having to specify how one network
is transformed into a later observed, quite different network, we only need to
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specify the probability distribution for the creation and termination of any
single tie. This probability distribution is specified as a Markov process, i.e.,
the probability of a change of a tie variable at time t is assumed to depend on
the current configuration at this moment,
(
X(t), Y (t)
)
– and on available
covariates –, and not on earlier states of the two networks. The model consists
of one component for changes in the one-mode network X , depending on the
current state of X as well as Y ; and another component for changes in the
two-mode network Y , depending on the current state of Y as well as X . The
model expresses the feedback between the one-mode and two-mode networks:
as soon as a tie changes in either network, this affects the network
neighborhood in both networks of all nodes involved directly or indirectly, and
thereby this affects the probabilities of later tie changes.
The model is actor-oriented, reflecting the agency of the nodes in the first
node set, N . At random time moments, the actors i ∈ N may change their
outgoing ties in the two-mode network, Yia for a ∈ A, or in the one-mode
network, Xij for j ∈ N . These changes are stochastic, and – like the earlier
proposed models – the models for these changes are split in (1) a model for
the timing and frequency of changes and (2) a model for the choice of the
changes. The model (1) for timing and frequency of changes often can be kept
quite simple, with a constant rate of change for the one-mode network and
another constant rate of change for the two-mode network. The word
‘constant’ refers here to constancy across actors and between two consecutive
observations tm−1 and tm. Sometimes it can be relevant to let rates of change
depend on actor attributes or positional characteristics, cf. Snijders (2001), but
this possibility is not considered here. Model specification focuses on model
(2) for the choice of tie changes. This is represented by so-called evaluation
functions. These are functions of the personal network of the actors, defined
separately for the one-mode network and the two-mode network. (We use the
term ‘personal network’ for the two-mode as well as for the one-mode
network.) Probabilities of tie changes by the actors are higher accordingly as
they lead to higher values of the evaluation functions. Thus, the evaluation
functions express the characteristics of their personal networks toward which
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the actors seem to be attracted.
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A mathematical description of the model is given in the Appendix. Here
we focus on the mathematical formulae representing the dependencies between
the two-mode and the one-mode networks described in Section 2. The
evaluation function for the two-mode network is defined as a linear
combination
fYi (x, y) =
∑
k
βYk s
Y
ki(x, y) , (1)
where the functions sYki(x, y), called effects, are descriptives of the personal
network, or extended personal network, of actor i. The effects to be included
must be chosen by the researcher based on research questions, theory, and
knowledge of the social setting of the network; the symbols βYk represent
statistical parameters indicating how strongly each effect affects the evolution
of the two-mode network. At any moment in time, given that actor i is
allowed to make a change in the two-mode network while the current
two-mode network is y and the current one-mode network is x, the probability
of making a tie change that would lead to a new two-mode network y′ is
higher accordingly as the resulting value of fYi (x, y′) is higher. Similarly, the
evaluation function governing changes in the one-mode network is modeled by
fXi (x, y) =
∑
k
βXk s
X
ki(x, y) . (2)
To express the dependencies discussed in Section 2, the effects will have to
depend also on the other network: sYki(x, y) must also depend on x and
sXki(x, y) must depend also on y.
First we consider the four nodal, or degree-related effects. The effect
denoted as “one-mode activity ⇒ two-mode activity” states that the drive for
actors i toward high values of the two-mode outdegree yi+ is stronger when
their one-mode outdegree xi+ is higher. This can be expressed by the function
sYki(x, y) = xi+ yi+: a positive parameter βYk for this effect will imply that the
probability of a change from outdegree yi+ to outdegree (yi+ + 1) will be
larger when the current one-mode outdegree xi+ is larger. With the appropriate
changes for the other nodal effects, this leads to the following specifications.
1. One-mode activity ⇒ two-mode activity:
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dependent variable Y , effect formula sYki(x, y) = xi+ yi+ .
2. two-mode activity ⇒ one-mode activity:
dependent variable X , effect formula sXki(x, y) = yi+ xi+ .
3. one-mode popularity ⇒ two-mode activity:
dependent variable Y , effect formula sYki(x, y) = x+i yi+ .
4. two-mode activity ⇒ one-mode popularity:
dependent variable X , effect formula sXki(x, y) = yi+ x+i .
The formulas for (1.) and (2.) have the same right-hand side, but refer to
different dependent variables. The same holds for formulas (3.) and (4.).
Next to these specifications based on the product of the two degrees, other
mathematical functions could be used. For example, it may sometimes be
reasonable to suppose that there are ‘decreasing marginal returns’ of higher
and higher degrees. For the “one-mode activity ⇒ two-mode activity” effect,
for instance, this can be reflected by specifying the effect as
sYki(x, y) = φ(xi+) yi+ where φ(x) is a concave function such as φ(x) =
√
x
(Snijders et al., 2010).
Second, we consider the three mixed triadic closure effects, see Figure 2.
Following a similar reasoning, these can be mathematically specified as
follows.
1. One-mode out-tie ⇒ two-mode agreement ({Xij and Yja}⇒ Yia):
sYki(x, y) =
∑
j,a xij yja yia .
2. One-mode in-tie ⇒ two-mode agreement ({Xji and Yja}⇒ Yia):
sYki(x, y) =
∑
j,a xji yja yia .
3. Two-mode agreement ⇒ one-mode out-tie ({Yia and Yja}⇒ Xij):
sXki(x, y) =
∑
j,a yia yja xij .
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4 Friendship, advice, and employment preference
in an MBA class
We now adopt the modeling framework sketched above to obtain a more
detailed understanding of the co-structuration of social interaction between job
searchers, and their orientation toward specific potential employers. The latter
is represented by a two-mode network, in which the first mode is constituted
by the students, and the second by the potential employers. The specific
setting is a cohort of students in a MBA program, the social interactions are
friendship and advice. Thus, we study how the two-mode network of
employment preference co-evolves with two one-mode networks of friendship
and advice.
4.1 Background
It is well recognized that social networks among labor market participants
affect important aspects of the matching between individuals and organizations
(Granovetter, 1974). For this reason, the dual association between individuals
looking for jobs and (actual or potential) employers is at the heart of
sociological models of hiring (Petersen et al., 2000), economic models of job
search and matching (Pissarides, 1990), and organizational models of group
affiliation (McPherson, 1983), employment choice (Kilduff, 1990), and
recruitment-based competition (Sorensen, 2004).
A number of empirical studies have tried to model the two-mode
association between individuals and organizations as the outcome of a
combination of attributes of the individuals, characteristics of the
organizations, and dimensions of the one-mode association between individuals
(‘social networks’). According to Montgomery (1992, p. 586), for example, in
the analysis of job search, “[n]etwork structure may be the crucial independent
variable”. Perhaps less generally appreciated is the fact that the process of job
search itself represents a focused activity that increases mutual awareness, and
facilitates the development of personal relationships (Feld, 1981, 1982).
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According to this view, the presence of network ties is not only an antecedent,
but also in part an outcome of the dual association between individuals and
organizations.
The process of job search as a focused activity capable of generating
network ties is clearly illustrated by Kilduff (1990) in a study of MBA
students that has provided direct inspiration to our own empirical work.
Killduff examines how friendship networks between MBA students affect their
employment choice. He argues that students use other students as sources of
information about prospective employers. This suggests that the job search
process generates information that students share through friendship networks
and then use to form preferences and expectations about potential employers –
which later on is likely to affect their organizational affiliation decisions.
Building on his findings, we suggest that processes of job search are affected
by, and at the same time affect social networks of interactions between labor
market participants. Job search is a domain where one-mode social networks
and two-mode affiliation networks affect one another. To the best of our
knowledge, however, an analytical statistical framework that affords
simultaneous examination of how social networks between individuals and
affiliation networks (networks between individuals and groups) co-evolve and
shape one another was not available until now.
4.2 Research setting and design
As Kilduff (1990) observed in his study of employment choice and social
networks among MBA students, the social life of participants in professional
management is organized around one basic question: “What kind of job shall I
have when I finish my MBA?” We followed a cohort of 75 MBA students
enrolled in one of the leading Italian Business Schools throughout their
program and in the process of choosing their employers. Our own observation
during the 17-month period confirmed that students constantly discuss and
exchange information about their employment preferences and job search
strategies. In the corridors, where upcoming recruitment schedules were
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posted, students exchanged opinions, shared job interview experiences, and
discussed the pros and cons of the various companies. We observed that
students not only discussed their employment preferences openly, but
frequently also devised collective strategies to approach target companies.
The data set analyzed is the result of a three-wave network panel design.
The overall observation period is the entire duration of the MBA program and
the observation points (‘waves’) are roughly equally spaced (March, July, and
early November). We relied on the conventional roster method to collect
information on social networks. The questionnaire was administered
individually and personally to each student (100% response rate). Building on
extensive prior research on interpersonal networks in organizations (Lazega,
2001; Kilduff and Krackhardt, 2008) we focused on networks of friendship
and advice relations. Each respondent was presented with a complete list of
names and asked to report the presence of the specified relation with the other
classmates. For friendship we asked respondents to indicate the names of
classmates with whom they felt they had developed meaningful social ties
outside the specific context of the program. The questionnaire specified
examples of social activities typically considered as signals of friendship such
as going to the movies, attending sport events, having dinner, playing football,
or going shopping. For advice relations we asked respondents to indicate the
names of students to whom they recurrently referred for information and
advice on course-related matters. The questions were framed in a
non-judgmental manner. Respondents were assured that there were no right or
wrong answers, privacy would be protected, and they were completely free to
select as many or few names as they wished. The same questions were asked
at each of the three data collection occasions.
For the information about students’ employment preferences, note that it is
common for business schools to actively develop interfaces with relevant
segments of the market for professional managers. Business schools maintain
lists of companies that regularly send recruiters on campus to interview and
select students during job fairs, recruitment campaigns, and other such events.
Each student was requested to express his or her preference for potential
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employers by mentioning a maximum of ten organizations. A total of one
hundred different companies were mentioned. The remarks made earlier in this
section about the social importance of employment preferences and job search
activities imply that shared preferences for employers may indeed be
interpreted in this social context as a social focus, i.e., a “social,
psychological, legal or physical entity around which joint activities are
organized” (Feld, 1981, p. 1016). For this reason we consider it useful to
represent the dual relation by students and their expressed employment
preferences as an affiliation network.
In addition, we collected information on a variety of individual attributes
such as gender, age, academic background, and nationality to control for
sources of individual heterogeneity. Additional information on the research
design and the sample may be found in Alessandro Lomi and Torlo` (2011).
4.3 Some descriptives
First we provide descriptive statistics of attributes of Students (Table 1). This
is followed by descriptives for each of the three networks considered on its
own (Tables 2-3). Finally we describe the association between the networks
(Table 4).
As Table 1 shows, the prevalent academic background of students is
economics and business (approximately 50%). Other academic backgrounds
include engineering (14%), humanities (13%), political sciences (11%), law
(8%) and natural sciences (4%). The proportion of foreign (non-Italian)
students is approximately 13%. Female students account for 38%. Students in
MBA programs are slightly older than students in other master programs
(average age 29), and have typically been exposed to relevant professional
experiences (here 52%). Information on average grades obtained during the
program is included to control for observable individual differences in
performance.
Stability between consecutive observations for the employment preference
network can be measured by Jaccard coefficients (Batagelj and Bren, 1995;
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Table 1: Percentages and averages for students (standard deviations in parenthe-
ses).
Business administration background 50%
Foreign (non Italian) 13%
Males 62%
Work experience more than 2 years 52%
Average Age 29.1 (3.2)
Performance (range 22–29) 26.0 (1.6)
Snijders et al., 2010) (values are between 0, obtained if all ties change, and 1,
indicating all ties stay the same). The values are .27 for the t1 ⇒ t2 transition
and .33 for t2 ⇒ t3. These values may be considered to be of intermediate
size. The stability of the one-mode networks is rather high: Jaccard
coefficients for network stability vary between 0.47 and 0.55 for friendship
and between 0.38 and 0.44 for advice.
From Table 2 it can be seen that the average degree in the two-mode
network decreases over time, revealing the job search process to become
progressively more focused.
Table 2: Descriptives for two-mode employment preference network.
t1 t2 t3
Average outdegree students 4.7 4.1 3.1
Average indegree employers 3.6 3.1 2.3
(s.d. in/outdegree) (4.3/2.8) (4.1/2.4) (3.5/2.3)
Table 3 shows that average degrees in the friendship and advice networks
do not change much over time. The friendship network shows a strong
tendency toward reciprocity. The advice network also shows a tendency toward
reciprocity, but weaker. Friendship shows a stronger tendency toward
transitivity than advice. For friendship, outdegrees are more variable than
indegrees, which might reflect differential response tendencies. For advice the
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indegrees are more variable than the outdegrees; a cause may be the existence
of a few attributes that clearly qualify students as potential advisors, such as
discipline, performance, and willingness to help, whereas friendship is based
on mutual attraction and homophily on relevant characteristics, processes
which do not lead to differential indegrees.
Table 3: Descriptives for friendship (‘Fr.’) and advice (‘Adv.’) networks:
Average degree; standard deviations of in- and outdegrees; reciprocity measured
as fraction of ties being reciprocated; clustering measured as fraction of triplets
i→ j → k for which also the tie i→ k exists.
Fr. t1 Fr. t2 Fr. t3 Adv. t1 Adv. t2 Adv. t3
Av. degree 9.9 9.2 8.3 4.1 4.9 4.5
(s.d. in/out) (9.5/6.2) (9.3/5.5) (6.8/5.3) (2.5/5.6) (3.1/5.5) (3.2/5.7)
Reciprocity 0.58 0.54 0.57 0.29 0.33 0.33
Clustering 0.44 0.40 0.38 0.24 0.24 0.26
For cross-network associations, a description at the tie level is meaningful
only for the association between the two one-mode networks; at the actor
level, we give correlations between outdegrees as descriptions of the
association between activity in the three networks. The tie-level association
between the friendship and advice networks can be expressed again by the
Jaccard coefficient, which over the three observations assumes the values .18,
.25, and .24. Under assumptions of independence between friendship and
advice the expected Jaccard coefficients would be .04 (all three observations);
the observed values, while not very high, are considerably higher. The
correlations between the outdegrees for the three networks, for each
observation moment, are given in Table 4. The outdegrees may be regarded as
indications of the activity level with respect to the three networks. The
correlations are positive but not high. Summarizing, there are positive
associations, with moderate values, between the three networks, at the tie level
(for friendship and advice) as well as the actor level (outdegrees).
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Table 4: Correlations between outdegrees of the three networks, for the three
time points separately.
t1 t2 t3
Fr. Adv. Fr. Adv. Fr. Adv.
Advice .10 .33 .35
Empl. pref. .28 .34 .22 .27 .29 .21
5 Model specification
In this section we first establish the basic goal of our empirical examination,
and then discuss the model specification in the form of lists of effects of the
kind sYki(x, y) and sXki(x, y) included in the evaluation functions (1) and (2). As
a general remark, note that one-mode networks are richer in local structure
than two-mode networks – the latter being defined by a restriction, viz., the
impossibility of ties between the two modes – and therefore more effects are
possible for one-mode than for two-mode networks.
5.1 Aims of the analysis
The general aim of the empirical study is to investigate mutual dependencies
between how the dynamics of friendship and advice depend on the
employment preference network, and how the dynamics of the latter
(two-mode) network depend on the two one-mode networks. The main
hypothesis concerns the existence of a mutually constitutive relation between
these three networks sustained by the triadic effects discussed in Section 2:
having employment preferences in common promotes friendship and advice
ties; and vice versa, friendship and advice ties promote the sharing of
employment preferences. Second, we are interested in cross-network
dependencies at the actor level between all three networks, as well as on the
dyadic level between friendship and advice.
We control for a variety of within-network dependencies and dependencies
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on exogenous factors. More specifically, we are also interested in how results
for the dynamics of networks when considered on their own (the ‘uniplex’
network analyses) are modified by including the cross-network dependencies;
in other words, how the self-organization of a given network may be partly
mediated by other networks.
5.2 Uniplex two-mode specification
The data collection for the two-mode network limited the out-degrees to 10.
This upper bound was respected in the simulations using the actor-oriented
model.
A number of effects for the dynamics of two-mode networks were
proposed by Koskinen and Edling (2010), which leads to the following list.
These effects are related to the effects for exponential random graph models
for cross-sectionally observed two-mode networks, cf. Agneessens and Roose
(2008) and Wang, Sharpe, Robins and Pattison (2009). In the first place, there
are various effects related to the degrees of the students and of the employers
in the two-mode network, reflecting the average degrees and the dispersion of
both types of degree. Recall that two-mode ties are represented as being
directed from the student to the employer.
1. Outdegree: this expresses the balance between creating and deleting ties.
2. Outdegree activity : the extent to which students who currently nominate
many employment preferences continue doing so; when this effect has a
positive parameter βYk , it reinforces or exacerbates existing outdegree
differentials.
3. Indegree popularity : the extent to which current indegrees contribute to
the probability that employers become or remain receivers of ties; a
positive indegree popularity effect can be interpreted as a Matthew effect
(“the rich get richer”, de Solla Price, 1976), where employers who at the
current moment receive many choices are, ‘because’ of this, popular
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among the students also for new choices. If associated with a positive
parameter, this effect reinforces or exacerbates existing indegree
differentials.
Two other important effects for two-mode networks are the three-path and
four-cycle effects, cf. Figure 3.
a. Three-path. b. Four-cycle.
Figure 3: Three-paths and four-cycles. Circles, left, are actors in N . Squares,
right, are activities in A.
4. The three-path effect for actor i is measured by the number of
three-paths where this actor is in the position with two ties, as pictured
in Fig. 3.a. This can be expressed as∑
j,a,b;j #=i,b #=a
yia yib yja . (3)
Instead of this, we use the closely related definition
sYki(x, y) =
∑
j,a,b
yia yib yja =
∑
a
yia yi+ y+a , (4)
because this has the nice interpretation of degree assortativity: it
expresses the extent to which students with high out-degrees tend to
mention employers with high in-degrees. The difference between these
two definitions is a function of the number of two-paths and the total
number of ties, and therefore with adequate control for these lower-order
configurations, the use of (4) will be equivalent to the use of (3).
5. The four-cycle effect expresses the extent to which students who share
one employment preference, will also tend to get, or keep, more
employment preferences in common. This effect is discussed in Robins
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and Alexander (2004) and Koskinen and Edling (2010) and may be
regarded as a two-mode version of closure. In line with Agneessens and
Roose (2008) this can be interpreted in two different ways: as a
consequence of latent attributes of students, determining their being
attracted to the same employers; or as a consequence of social influence
between students. It is measured by the number of four-cycles in which
the focal actor i is involved,
sYki(x, y) =
∑
j,a,b
yia yib yja yjb , (5)
where the term ‘cycle’ is used disregarding the nominal orientation of
the ties.
5.3 Uniplex one-mode specification
For the dynamics of the two one-mode networks, friendship and advice, as far
as this follows from endogenous (within-network) dependence and dependence
on exogenous covariates, we follow the general experience in the analysis of
longitudinal network data summarized in the rules suggested in Snijders et al.
(2010), where further motivation and mathematical formulae may be found.
For friendship and advice the same model specification will be used to obtain
comparability. The following structural effects are included in the objective
function.
• Outdegree: see its description above for the two-mode case;
• reciprocity: the extent to which i→ j leads to j → i;
• transitive triplets: the tendency for friends of friends to become or
remain friends, and similar for advisers, i.e., for i→ j → k to lead to
i→ k;
• three-cycles: the tendency for i→ j → k to lead to triadic closure in a
cyclical direction, k → i;
• indegree popularity: see its description above for the two-mode case;
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• outdegree popularity: the extent to which current outdegrees contribute
to the probability that individuals become or remain receivers of ties
(which has no analogy for the two-mode network);
• outdegree activity: see its description above for the two-mode case.
For individual covariates, we can specify the ‘ego’ or ‘sender’ effect,
expressing that higher values of this variable lead the students to send more
ties; the ‘alter’ or ‘receiver’ effect, expressing that higher values of this
variable lead the students to receive more ties; the ‘similarity’ effect,
expressing that pairs of students with more similar values have a higher
tendency to be tied; and, relevant for categorical variables, the ‘same’ effect,
expressing that pairs of students with the same value have a higher tendency to
be tied. The nature of the academic environment and of the expertise that is
the presumed basis of the advice relation leads to academic performance as a
main explanatory variable for the advice relation. Ego, alter, as well as
similarity effects are relevant here. As we wish to use the same model
specification for both one-mode relations, this also is used for the friendship
dynamics. As control variables, we use sex (ego, alter, and ‘same’ effects) and
having the same nationality.
5.4 Cross-dependencies between one-mode networks
Cross-network dependencies between the two-mode and one-mode networks
were discussed in Sections 2 and 3 and are not repeated here. For the
co-evolution of the two one-mode networks, friendship and advice, some
additional dyadic cross-network dependencies can be specified. The first is the
direct tie-level effect, where a tie according to relation W (here denoting the
other one-mode network) leads to a tie according to the dependent one-mode
network X .
• Direct association: sXki(x, w) =
∑
j wij xij .
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The second is mixed reciprocity, or generalized exchange: the reciprocation of
a W -tie by an X-tie.
• Mixed reciprocity : sXki(x, w) =
∑
j wji xij .
Mixed triads are also possible in the co-evolution of two one-mode networks.
They were fitted in preliminary models for the co-evolution of friendship and
advice but were not significant. They are further not discussed here.
5.5 Parameter estimation
Parameters were estimated by the method of moments, using the procedures
and algorithms analogous to those in Snijders, Steglich and Schweinberger
(2007), employing the RSiena package (Ripley et al., 2012) of the statistical
system R (R Development Core Team, 2011). As mentioned in the first two of
these references, parameters can be tested by referring the t-ratio (estimate
divided by standard error) to a standard normal distribution. In all cases, good
convergence was obtained with all t-ratios for convergence less than 0.1, as
advised in the manual.
Some clearly non-significant effects were dropped from the model. Several
non-significant effects were retained in the results presented below because
they were of primary interest (cross-network effects) or because it was
preferred to report the same models for friendship and advice. Dropping
further non-significant effects did not lead to important changes in the
remaining results.
26
6 Results
As a background we first briefly present results for the dynamics of each
network when studied by itself, i.e., the uniplex dynamics. Then we give
results for the multiplex dynamics.
6.1 Uniplex results
The results for each network separately express models in which mutual
dependencies between the networks are ignored. This serves as a description
of the dynamics of the networks when considered on their own, and as a point
of reference for the multiplex dynamics. Table 5 reports the parameter
estimates for the dynamics of friendship, advice, and employment preference
with their associated standard errors.
To assiste interpretation, note that the parameters are the coefficients βY
and βX in (1) and (2). For their interpretation, note that these are multiplied
by the effects sYki(x, y) and sXki(x, y) to give the probabilities of change in the
evaluation functions; cf. equations (1)–(2) and (8)–(9). Hence these are
non-standardized parameters on a logistic scale. The parameter estimates in
Table 5 for the indegree popularity and outdegree activity effects are larger for
the one-mode networks than for the two-mode networks because (to obtain a
better fit) for the one-mode network dynamics, the degrees in the roles of
independent variables are transformed by a square root, leading to decreased
variability especially at high values which is compensated by larger parameter
values. For comparing effects of covariates it should be kept in mind that
nationality and sex are dichotomous while performance has a range from 22 to
29 and standard deviation 1.6; performance similarity is a dyadic
transformation of performance defined in such a way (see Snijders et al.,
2010) that it is scaled between 0 and 1, the value 1 (maximum similarity)
meaning that the two students have the same performance, and 0 meaning that
one student has the minimum (22) and the other the maximum (29) value of
performance. This is the reason for the smaller numerical values of the
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parameter estimates (and standard errors) of the alter and ego effects of
performance.
Table 5: Results: Separate models for evolution of friendship, advice, and em-
ployment preference.
Friendship Advice Empl. pref.
Effect par. (s.e.) par. (s.e.) par. (s.e.)
Out-degree –1.840∗∗ (0.233) –2.267∗∗ (0.321) –2.595∗∗ (0.118)
Reciprocity 1.604∗∗ (0.097) 1.329∗∗ (0.131) —
Transitive triplets 0.188∗∗ (0.017) 0.320∗∗ (0.038) —
Three-cycles –0.095∗∗ (0.030) –0.065 (0.061) —
Four-cycles — — 0.090∗∗ (0.019)
Indegree popularity 0.218∗∗ (√) (0.062) 0.245∗∗ (√) (0.057) 0.086∗∗ (0.014)
Outdegree popularity –0.383∗∗ (√) (0.065) –0.346∗ (√) (0.143) —
Outdegree activity –0.079† (√) (0.041) –0.088 (√) (0.062) 0.085∗∗ (0.019)
Outd.-ind. assortativity — — –0.012∗∗ (0.003)
Same nationality 0.240∗∗ (0.080) 0.450∗∗ (0.124) —
Sex (M) alter –0.016 (0.070) –0.043 (0.092) —
Sex (M) ego –0.158∗ (0.070) –0.269∗∗ (0.096) —
Same Sex 0.277∗∗ (0.065) 0.168† (0.086) —
Performance alter –0.015 (0.023) 0.129∗∗ (0.036) —
Performance ego –0.076∗∗ (0.024) –0.107∗∗ (0.034) —
Performance similarity 0.764∗∗ (0.188) 0.735∗∗ (0.245) —
The (√) symbol means that the transformation φ(x) =
√
x is used for transforming the degrees in
the role of independent variables, cf. Section 3.
Significance symbols: † : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01 (two-sided).
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The results for friendship and advice are rather similar. The tendencies
toward reciprocity and transitivity, as well as the tendency to have few
three-cycles for the friendship network, are in line with other results for
dynamics of networks with a component of sociability. Indegree popularity is
positive, indicating a Matthew effect and a tendency to differentiated
indegrees. Outdegree popularity is negative, indicating that those who mention
a lot of friends or advisors are less popular when considered by others as
potential friends or advisors, respectively. For friendship as well as advice
there is a tendency towards homophily especially with respect to performance,
and also (but less strongly) for nationality and sex. Males tend to ask less for
advice and (less strongly) to mention fewer friends. High performers tend to
ask for advice less, and to be asked more; there is no similar tendency for
friendship. The main differences between the dynamics of the advice and the
friendship networks are that advice is more strongly transitive, and more
strongly dependent on performance of senders and receivers; and that
homophily with respect to nationality is stronger, and for sex weaker, for
advice as compared to friendship.
For the employment preference network, there were no significant effects
of actor variables: the students’ sex, nationality, performance, or experience
did not have significant effects on the dynamics of the number of preferred
employers mentioned. There was a significant effect toward four-cycles: if a
pair of students has one employment preference in common, then it is likely
that they will get more in common, or keep several common interests if these
exist already. There also are significant effects of indegree popularity and
outdegree activity: students mentioning many employers will continue doing
so, or further augment this tendency; employers attracting much attention from
students likewise will continue this or get even more attention. Finally, there is
a negative indegree-outdegree assortativity, meaning that students who mention
many employers differ especially from those who mention few, by mentioning
more of the less popular employers.
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6.2 Multiplex results
The results for the co-evolution of friendship, advice, and employment
preference are given in Table 6. The table presents asterisk signs representing
two-sided p-values. In the interpretations below, one-sided p-values are used in
cases where theoretically a positive effect is expected. We first discuss the
interpretation of the cross-network effects, working upward from the bottom of
Table 6.
Of the four hypothesized mixed triadic effects (cf. Section 5.1 and
Figure 2), two are significant. Agreement with respect to employment
preference leads to advice ties (t = 0.151/0.078 = 1.93, one-sided p = 0.03)
and advice ties lead to agreement with respect to employment preference
(t = 0.274/0.153 = 1.79, one-sided p = 0.04).
There are some actor-level dependencies between employment preference
and friendship. Interest in many employers leads to nominating many friends
(t = 0.235/0.101 = 2.32, two-sided p = 0.03) and there is some evidence also
for the reverse (with more decimals than in the table:
t = 0.0101/0.0055 = 1.84, two-sided p = 0.07).
There are rather strong negative actor-level effects between friendship and
advice. Being mentioned by many as an advisor leads to being mentioned by
few as a friend (t = −0.151/0.048 = −3.15, two-sided p < 0.01) and vice
versa (t = −0.273/0.064 = −4.27, two-sided p < 0.001). Mentioning many
advisors leads to mentioning few friends (t = −0.214/0.076 = −2.82,
two-sided p < 0.01) and vice versa (t = −0.300/0.055 = −5.45, two-sided
p < 0.001). This could be interpreted as a kind of specialization: students
mention either many friends or many advisors, but not many of both; and
students are mentioned either by many as a friend or by many as an advisor,
but not both.
Table 6: Results: Co-evolution of friendship, advice, and employment prefer-
ence.
Friendship Advice Empl. pref.
Effect par. (s.e.) par. (s.e.) par. (s.e.)
within-network
Out-degree –2.980∗∗ (0.284) –4.135∗∗ (0.424) –2.525∗∗ (0.141)
Reciprocity 1.280∗∗ (0.119) 0.517∗∗ (0.158) —
Transitive triplets 0.153∗∗ (0.018) 0.243∗∗ (0.038) —
Three-cycles –0.061† (0.032) –0.087 (0.062) —
Four-cycles — — 0.085∗ (0.031)
Indegree popularity 0.386∗∗ (√) (0.064) 0.330∗∗ (√) (0.053) 0.071∗∗ (0.018)
Outdegree popularity –0.354∗∗ (√) (0.073) 0.062 (√) (0.152) —
Outdegree activity 0.023 (√) (0.045) 0.013 (√) (0.075) 0.074∗∗ (0.021)
Outd.-ind. assortativity — — –0.010∗∗ (0.003)
Same nationality 0.203∗ (0.084) 0.327∗∗ (0.125) —
Sex (M) alter –0.033 (0.070) 0.038 (0.098) —
Sex (M) ego –0.147∗ (0.074) –0.182† (0.099) —
Same Sex 0.237∗∗ (0.072) 0.052 (0.094) —
Performance alter –0.022 (0.028) 0.151∗∗ (0.040) —
Performance ego –0.098∗∗ (0.026) –0.059 (0.038) —
Performance similarity 0.789∗∗ (0.189) 0.465† (0.261) —
between-network: dyadic
Friendship — 1.792∗∗ (0.220) —
Reciprocal friendship — 0.356∗ (0.180) —
Advice 1.672∗∗ (0.227) — —
Reciprocal advice 0.730∗∗ (0.193) — —
between-network: actor-level
Friendship ind. popularity — –0.273∗∗ (√) (0.064) —
Friendship outd. activity — –0.300∗∗ (√) (0.055) 0.010∗ (0.005)
Advice ind. popularity –0.151∗∗ (√) (0.048) — —
Advice outd. activity –0.214∗∗ (√) (0.076) — –0.014 (0.021)
Empl. choice outd. activity 0.235∗ (√) (0.101) 0.202 (√) (0.124) —
between-network: mixed triads
Employment pref. agreement –0.085 (0.066) 0.151† (0.078) —
Friendship leading to agreement — — –0.065 (0.074)
Advice leading to agreement — — 0.274† (0.153)
The (√) symbol means that the transformation φ(x) =
√
x is used for transforming the degrees in
the role of independent variables, cf. Section 3.
Significance symbols: † : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01 (two-sided).31
The dyad-level effects between the friendship and the advice networks are
strong. Direct effects are very strong, with estimated parameter values of 1.672
and 1.792. Reciprocal effects, where j mentioning i as an advisor leads to i
mentioning j as a friend, and vice versa, are also strong, but less so than the
direct effects. Asking for advice seems to be reciprocated by friendship more
strongly (parameter value 0.730) than the other way around (0.356).
Summarizing the cross-network effects between friendship and advice, it can
be concluded that these networks are positively related at the dyadic level but
negatively at the actor level.
The comparison between the uniplex and multiplex (or multivariate)
analysis is discussed in the next section.
7 Emergence and Mediation
By considering jointly the evolution of a one-mode and a two-mode network,
as represented in Tables 5 and 6, one obtains a richer and potentially deeper
insight in the processes driving the changes in both of these networks than by
considering the evolution of both networks separately.
The representation of the internal dynamics of the two-mode network of
employment preferences, given in the right-hand columns of Tables 5 and 6, is
not changed a lot by taking into account the effects of the friendship and
advice networks. The effects of friendship and advice on the employment
preference network, where high friendship outdegrees lead to high employment
preference outdegrees, and where advice ties lead to shared preferences for
employers, do not replace or alter the within-network dependencies.
The situation is different for the interdependence of friendship and advice.
The parameters for reciprocity in Table 6 are lower than the corresponding
parameters in Table 5, especially for advice where the reciprocity parameter
drops from 1.3 to 0.5. This suggests that the socially stabilizing effect for
advice of reciprocation appears to be not a matter of the advice relation itself,
but is for a large part mediated by friendship. Also the homophily effects
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found for advice turn out to be partially mediated by friendship: one could say
that students turn to similar others for friendship who then become advisors,
but what in the uniplex analysis seems to be homophily in advice ties is
largely a byproduct of the multiplexity of advice with friendship.
This insight obtained from multiplex dynamics has interesting substantive
interpretations for the study of advice relations, enriching conclusions from
studies of uniplex dynamics of advice such as Lazega, Mounier, Snijders and
Tubaro (2010). Asking for advice potentially leads to loss of status (Blau,
1955); to facilitate advice relations, therefore, compensatory strategies often
are used. Direct reciprocity (exchanging advice for advice) is one such
strategy, generalized reciprocity (exchanging advice for something else, but not
for status) is another (Lazega and Pattison, 1999), and also homophily can
contribute to mitigating the risk of status differentials associated with an
advice tie. Here we see that what in the uniplex analysis of Table 5 seems to
be direct reciprocity (parameter value 1.329), turns out to be better explained
(in the multiplex analysis of Table 6) as embeddedness of the advice tie in a
multiplex tie including friendship (direct effect: parameter value 1.792),
preferably reciprocal (parameter value 0.356), with a residual component of
‘pure’ direct reciprocity (value 0.517). This result is in line with, but it also
goes beyond, the cross-sectional results produced by Lazega and Pattison
(1999). Similarly, what in the uniplex analysis seems to be a homophily
strategy for diminishing risks of status loss due to advice can be interpreted in
part as a consequence of multiplexity of advice with friendship.
8 Conclusions
Social settings both generate, and are influenced by social networks (Feld,
1981; Pattison and Robins, 2002). Yet, no model has so far been available to
assist in representing and analyzing how such duality unfolds over time. In
this paper we filled this gap. We have presented a statistical model for the
co-evolution of a two-mode and a one-mode network, in line with
actor-oriented models for the evolution of uniplex two-mode (Koskinen and
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Edling, 2010) and one-mode (Snijders, 2001) networks and with models for
the co-evolution of networks and behavior (Steglich et al., 2010). These
models can be used to study the co-evolution of interactions between actors
and their social settings. Studying the interdependent dynamics for several
networks, one-mode and/or two-mode, can yield deeper insights than studying
dynamics of single networks. The model elaborated here assumes that all
agency resides in the actors who are the first mode of the two-mode network
(constituting also the node set of the one-mode network). The activities or
events constituting the second mode are assumed to be merely recipients of
choices. In some situations this is a reasonable assumption, or a reasonable
approximation, but in others (cf. Logan, 1998) it makes more sense to assume
that both modes have agency, and some coordination, matching, or negotiation
process takes place for ties to be created. New models will be needed for such
an approach.
The model was applied to studying the interdependent dynamics of
(two-mode) labor market preferences and (one-mode) friendship and advice
relations in a cohort of MBA students. Preferences with respect to potential
employers were regarded as social settings in which job seekers “meet”, and
establish or change their social connections. We found evidence for mixed
triadic effects between the two-mode network and the advice network: being
an advisor leads to agreement on labor market preferences, and those agreeing
about labor market preferences tend to become advisors. In addition, we found
actor-level effects linking the two-mode network and the friendship network: a
high number of employment preferences leads to higher numbers of friendship
nominations and vice versa. This confirms our initial idea that the employment
preferences may be regarded as social foci, and are meaningfully linked to the
friendship and advice networks. However, the types of links are different: for
advice the link is with agreement about employment preferences, i.e., content;
for friendship the link is with the amount of activity, i.e., expression.
In addition, we found strong interdependence between the friendship and
advice networks, the dependence being positive at the dyadic level,
interpretable as multiplexity; and negative at the actor level, interpretable as
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specialization.
In two-mode and one-mode networks alike, various network structures may
come about through similarity on unobserved variables; this is discussed in the
two-mode context in Agneessens and Roose (2008). In our analysis, the
variables available did not contribute to explaining the two-mode network
dynamics. It will be interesting in future studies to collect variables on both of
the modes that are predictive of the matching process that is fundamental for
the creation of two-mode links.
Since the two-mode network can be regarded as an array of changing
binary attributes of the actors, there is a similarity between the co-evolution of
a one-mode and a two-mode network as studied here, and the co-evolution of
(one-mode) networks and behavior as studied in Steglich et al. (2010). The
two-mode network represents multiple binary attributes; the behavior as
studied in the mentioned paper corresponds to one, or a few, binary or ordinal
discrete attributes. The main mathematical difference is that, when the
attributes are regarded jointly as a two-mode network, the nodes in the second
mode A are regarded as being exchangeable – or conditionally exchangeable
given their attributes, if these are available for the second mode. This goes
along with a difference in the usual number of attributes (many for the
two-mode network approach, few for the behavior approach) which leads to a
difference in focus of attention (a collective of various kinds of activities or
attributes, versus one or a few specific behaviors). However, the basic
mathematical models are quite similar.
Research questions about the interdependent selection of network partners
and social influence exerted by network partners on each other’s behavior can
be combined in a natural way with research about the co-evolution of
one-mode and two-mode networks. As an example, consider a co-evolving
one-mode network of friendship, two-mode network of activities, and behavior
variable representing lifestyle, with a research question concerning peer
influence on lifestyle. Then an important question is: what is the relevant peer
group that may influence the lifestyle of any given actor? It could be the
personal network of the actor; but it could also be the group of those
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participating in the same activities as the focal actor, or a larger group such as
the neighborhood where the actor lives. If the activities are self-selected, just
like the friendship network, then the first two are associated and a large
amount of data will be necessary to differentiate between them. Given relevant
data, a combination of the models proposed in this paper and those in Steglich
et al. (2010) could be used in principle to answer this type of research
question.
Appendix
The model for representing the multiplex dynamics of one- and two-mode
networks may be summarized as follows. The model is a continuous-time
Markov chain, and the state (Y,X) consists of the two-mode network Y and
the one-mode network X . At any given moment, the time elapsing until the
next opportunity for change in either network – which is called a ministep –
has an exponential distribution. This is a property of Markov processes
(Norris, 1997). The timing component of the model determines its duration as
well as who will be the actor i who will make this step and whether this step
will be for the one-mode or the two-mode network. Given that actor i can
make a ministep in a given network, the choice as to which outgoing tie
variable of this actor will be changed, or whether nothing will be changed at
all, is determined by the choice component of the model. This is further
specified in detail below.
1. Timing component
The rate functions λYi (x, y) and λXi (x, y), respectively, represent, given current
states x and y of the two networks, the expected number of occasions per unit
of time for actor i to have the opportunity for making a change in one of the
outgoing ties Yia(t) or, respectively, one of the ties Xij(t). Using properties of
Markov processes and the exponential distribution (Norris, 1997), this can be
summarized as follows.
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Consider any time moment t with current state (x, y). The waiting time
until the next opportunity for change by any actor in either of the two
networks is exponentially distributed with expected value
1
λY+(x, y) + λ
X
+ (x, y)
, (6)
where
λY+(x, y) =
∑
i∈N
λYi (x, y), λ
X
+ (x, y) =
∑
i∈N
λXi (x, y) .
Given an opportunity for change, the probabilities that this is an opportunity
for actor i to make a change either in the two-mode network or in the
one-mode network, respectively, are given by
λYi (x, y)
λX+ (x, y) + λ
Y
+(x, y)
and
λXi (x, y)
λX+ (x, y) + λ
Y
+(x, y)
. (7)
2. Tie choice component
The evaluation function fYi (x, y) represents the relative propensity for actor i
to make a change toward state y of the two-mode network given that the
one-mode network has state x; similarly, fXi (x, y) represents the relative
propensity for actor i to make a change toward state x of the one-mode
network, given that the two-mode network has state y. These propensities are
measured on the scale of log-probabilities, and their values may be compared
only between changes that are permitted from a given current state. As we
mentioned above, permitted changes are all the changes of one particular
single tie variable in the given network by the given actor.
Some additional notation is needed to express the probability distributions.
Since tie variables Yia and Xij are dichotomous, a change of a tie variable –
creation or termination of a tie – can be regarded as a toggle of the tie
variable: a change of Yia or Xij into 1− Yia or 1−Xij , respectively. For a
given network y, we denote by y(±ia) the network in which tie variable yia is
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toggled into 1− yia, while all other tie variables remain the same:
y(±ia)jb = y
(±ia)
jb for all (j, b) "= (i, a);
y(±ia)ia = 1− y(±ia)ia ,
and similarly for x(±ij).
When actor i has the opportunity to change a two-mode tie, and the
current state of the system is (x, y), the two-mode networks that can be
obtained are y(±ia) for any a ∈ A, together with the current y. For the
potentially resulting networks, the evaluation function assumes the values
fYi
(
x, y(±ia)
)
. The conditional probability of changing the affiliation tie to a is
P
{
Y (t) changes to y(ia) | X(t) = x, Y (t) = y}
=
exp
(
fYi (x, y
(±ia))
)
fYi (x, y) +
∑
b∈A exp
(
fYi (x, y
(±ib))
) . (8)
It is assumed that one of the options for actor i is not to change anything
(where an interpretation is that i is satisfied with the network as it is), which is
represented by the term fYi (x, y), the evaluation function for the current
network, in the denominator of (8).
Similarly, when actor i has the opportunity to change a one-mode tie, the
one-mode networks that can be obtained as a result of this change are all
x(±ij) for j "= i as well as the current x. The evaluation function has for the
resulting changed networks the values fXi
(
x(±ij), y
)
. By N (i) we denote the
set of all actors except i, i.e., N (i) = {j ∈ N | j "= i}. The probability of
making a particular change at such an opportunity of change is defined as
P
{
X(t) changes to x(ij) | X(t) = x, Y (t) = y}
=
exp
(
fXi
(
x(±ij), y
))
exp(fXi (x, y)) +
∑
h∈N (i) exp
(
fXi
(
x(±ih), y
)) . (9)
The model is specified further by defining the rate functions and evaluation
functions. With respect to rate functions, attention here is restricted to rate
functions that are constant between measurement moments. Extensions to rate
functions depending on attributes or positional characteristics of the actors are
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possible as in (Snijders, 2001). We discussed the specification of evaluation
functions in Sections 3 and 5.
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